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Abstract
This article examines how Unger’s Confessions of a Beautiful Soul written by Herself creates a new model of
moral acquisition. This model finds its place between religious morality and moral performance, calling for the
novel’s protagonist, Mirabella, to cultivate a moral self through the spiritual practice of reading. Such a model
still revolves around moral transformation, but it is no longer of her soul, but rather her thoughts; that is,
Mirabella must first collect various depictions of morality from a wide scope of literature, then choose from
these which ones she deems as of greatest importance to her, namely virginity and the control of the passions,
and then apply these two concepts in great measure to her self. The proof of her successful cultivation is then
evident in her physiognomy. This model is as new as it is radical; first, it provides an alternative to Goethe’s
model in his fictional autobiography, Confessions of a Beautiful Soul; second, it contains implications for
Mirabella in terms of both gender and class; finally, it allows for a new form of moral authenticity during a
time of growing artifice in late eighteenth-century Germany. Foucault’s notions of self-cultivation in The Care
of the Self, as well as the commentaries on physiognomy advanced in the works of Lavater and Winckelmann,
provide the interpretive lens for this new model.
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In eighteenth-century Germany, there was a significant shift in autobiographical 
writing from pietistic confessions to secular accounts of life lived.i In this shift, 
the metaphysical concept of morality was replaced by emerging notions of moral 
performance. In regard to the former—the prototype of which is August Hermann 
Francke’s Curriculum Vitae (Lebenslauf [1690/91])—a person’s innate being was 
a fundamental premise and the development of his or her being from immoral to 
moral was orchestrated through no other means than divine conversion. For the 
latter, the mere appearance of morality, now subjectively defined, was given 
greater precedence. However, as this article argues, this shift was not tectonic, but 
rather gradual. German autobiographies during this time give evidence to the 
exploration of a third model of moral acquisition, in which rhetorical, narrative 
and conceptual continuities between the religious and secular genres can be 
identified. In these writings, the emerging modern self does not replace the soul 
but rather incorporates it throughout its cultivation, thereby crafting a spiritually 
moral self. 
 
Drawing from Michel Foucault’s notion of self-cultivation in The Care of the Self 
(1986), this article considers how Mirabella, in Friederike Helene Unger’s 
fictional autobiography Confessions of a Beautiful Soul written by Herselfii 
(Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele von ihr selbst geschrieben [1806]), cultivates a 
moral self through spiritual practices. In the Confessions, Mirabella is still 
concerned with moral transformation, but its nexus is no longer her soul, but 
rather her thoughts. That is, she must cultivate and then act out her own unique 
form of morality utilizing her individual spheres of knowledge; instead of gaining 
an understanding of a doctrinally-based morality, Mirabella intentionally removes 
herself from any religious authoritative voice so as to create her own subjective 
moral form. This she accomplishes by first collecting various definitions and 
depictions of morality from a wide scope of secular literature, then choosing from 
these which ones she deems as of greatest importance to her, namely virginity and 
the control of the passions, and then applying these two concepts in great measure 
to her self. It is this new approach that links Mirabella’s confession with modern 
self-cultivation, the latter of which Foucault describes as “a set of practices whose 
goal is the possibility of thinking differently” (45); for if individuals are unable to 
separate themselves from the opinions of their traditional affiliations, they will 
take up a posture that Foucault found ridiculous, namely that they will continue to 
have others tell them what to do and how to think (Ibid.). Finally, in a reversion 
back to the religious triadic paradigm of body, mind and soul, Mirabella 
concludes her confessions with a discussion of her accompanying aesthetic 
arrangement, i.e., physical proof of her moral self, which she argues must be both 
tested and refined before her cultivation can be considered complete.  
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Unger’s Confessions is arguably crafted as a direct response to the fictional 
autobiography “Confessions of a Beautiful Soul” (“Bekenntnisse einer schönen 
Seele”) in Book VI of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s developmental novel, 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre [1796/96]), which 
describes the moral self-cultivation of an unnamed woman (the “beautiful soul”). 
This seemingly religious woman also seeks to gain the heralded virtue of pietism, 
i.e., morality, by rejecting the path of transformation through divine conversion 
and instead pursuing a more modern and secular form of development. The 
“beautiful soul” engages in intensive readings of one specific pietistic hymnal 
and, through her selections and applications of it, she claims to achieve chastity in 
its highest form. Thereafter, the “beautiful soul” recedes from society, believing 
that her moral perfection would be tainted, or threatened, by any form of human 
contact, be it the court, her pietistic (specifically Moravian) community or even 
her family. By the end of the “Confessions,” she is utterly alone, yet in complete 
bliss, concluding that, “I follow my thoughts freely and do not know of either 
restrictions or remorse” (“Ich folge mit Freiheit meinen Gesinnungen und weiß so 
wenig von Einschränkung als von Reue” [HA 7:421]).iii 
 
One of Unger’s secondary purposes is to counter Goethe with a model of moral 
self-cultivation from a female perspective. There are several explicit differences 
between these two “beautiful souls,” including the attitude that both of them have 
toward their own development; while Goethe’s “beautiful soul” assumes a pre-
existing level of morality, in Unger’s novel, Mirabella views her self as a tabula 
rasa, seeing her life’s purpose as pursuing a long-term cultivation of both moral 
thought and behavior. More importantly, Goethe and Unger provide different 
methods for how their female protagonists should craft a moral self. Goethe sets 
up a model in which the “beautiful soul’s” development is mediated by her male 
relatives, first by her fiancée and later by her uncle. Unger, conversely, gradually 
removes the male voice from her narrative, allowing Mirabella to gain a level of 
independence over her specifically female self.iv Finally, the morality of Goethe’s 
“beautiful soul” incorporates both religious and secular knowledge, while 
Mirabella chooses to craft her morality from secular constructs alone. It is no 
surprise then that feminist critics argue that Unger’s novel should be read as a 
feminist revision of Goethe’s “Confessions,”v a revision which Goethe himself 
largely disapproved of.vi 
 
The Confessions is written in the form of three letters to Mirabella’s male friend, 
Cäsar. Her first letter to him begins with a description of her self in its original 
state as an orphaned child. Her first words are, “Who my parents were, I cannot 
say; for I have never met them”vii (“Wer meine Eltern gewesen sind, vermag ich 
nicht zu sagen; denn ich habe sie nie kennen gelernt” [3]). In beginning the story 
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of her life as such, Mirabella creates an immediate disconnect from both 
biological ancestry and religious heritage. In doing so, her orphaned status 
metaphorically represents the phenomenon taking place around 1800, in which 
individuals were beginning to become detached from the socio-familial 
framework within which their lives used to unfold, including the attitudes, 
practices and forms of existence that these affiliations affirmed (Foucault 41). At 
the same time, Mirabella the orphan directly challenges the concept of the family 
– in this first paragraph of her letter, she concludes by stating, “My existence was 
the outcome of a misalliance” (“Meine Existenz sey die Wirkung eines 
Miβbündnisses” [3]). She relegates her biological parents to nothing more than a 
mistake, a “misalliance,” that assumingly she is glad to be rid of. Judith E. Martin 
(2011) argues in this vein that Unger eradicates the stability of the genealogical 
family tradition in order to emphasize instead Mirabella’s unique and 
individualistic personality (“Early Fictional Responses” 108). Furthermore, 
Mirabella’s lack of family correlates to two of Foucault’s distinctions of the 
modern individual (Foucault 42). The first of these is an individualistic attitude, 
defined as the absolute value of the individual in his or her singularity and 
independence from the group that he or she used to belong to. In this case, 
Mirabella can focus on her own self since she is detached from her family. The 
second distinction is in the intensity of the relations to the self. That is, one should 
see the self as an object that must be acted upon. Here there is a distinction 
between Mirabella’s self and the pietistic soul, for unlike the Pietist whose 
original state is already defined (i.e., as sinful), Mirabella sees herself as a blank 
slate, an object that needs to be crafted and over which she has complete 
authority. 
 
Having established a certain attitude toward her self, Mirabella begins a program 
of moral self-cultivation through the spiritual practice of reading that likewise 
challenges traditional boundaries. This she begins a few days after being adopted 
when her foster father introduces three French authors to her: Jean de la Fontaine, 
Peter Corneille and Jean Racine. These works become for her a first education. It 
is interesting to note that though her adoptive parents are clerics they do not begin 
her readings in standard pietistic fashion with passages from the Bible or with 
common prayers and catechisms; as Mirabella explains, “Although [my adoptive 
father] was spiritual, he was not concerned with religious instruction; for no other 
reason than he didn’t want to place on me certain dogma or formal morals” (“Wie 
sehr er auch Geistlicher war, so befaβte er sich doch nicht mit der Unterweisung 
in der Religion; unstreitig aus keinem anderen Grunde, als weil er noch kein 
bestimmtes Dogma in mich niederlegen wollte” [5-6]). The actions of this foster 
father immediately deconstruct the traditional authority of the cleric; instead of 
forcing his daughter to conform, he enables her to become her own individual. 
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Mirabella’s inclusion that “he was spiritual” affirms his continued interest in 
morals, but not solely those determined by authoritative, religious institutions. For 
this reason, Mirabella’s adoptive father provides her with a counter-instruction—a 
set of three French and specifically secular classics, each of which provide their 
own moral commentaries—and he gives her the freedom to craft from them her 
own moral code. But not only is this new moral self-cultivation overtly secular, it 
also strays outside of the confines of what was traditionally considered feminine. 
Mirabella explains that “this lecture did not yet adhere to those things which 
constituted the elements of a female education” (“die Lektüre [gehörte] noch nicht 
zu den Dingen, welche die Elemente einer weiblichen Erziehung ausmachen” 
[9]). She does not label this education as strictly masculine; rather, she speaks of 
the feminine in a futuristic form. The reading of these specific texts is “not yet” 
part of a female education, but through such pioneering endeavors such as her 
own, it soon will be. 
 
Mirabella’s treatment of this French literature is focused and intentional. She 
describes her approach as follows: “Through my foster father, I became familiar 
at the age of fifteen with three French authors, who I diligently read and nearly 
learned by heart” (“So war ich doch durch meinen Pflegevater von meinem 
funfzehnten Jahre an mit drei französischen Dichtern bekannt geworden, die ich 
unablässig las und beinahe auswendig lernte” [9]). In the first, her moderation 
contrasts the stereotypical female figure whose development suffers from reading 
in excess.viii More importantly, although these texts are secular, Mirabella reads 
them through the pietistic lens of introspection. Not only is her reading limited to 
three authors, but she is close to having their works memorized. Mirabella turns 
the books she reads into a spiritual practice by reflecting upon the morals 
presented to her and deciding from them which she would like to apply to herself, 
namely chastity. Mirabella follows this choice with an elucidation of each author. 
She begins with La Fontaine, whose fables, “endlessly draw me in, because in 
them a world is contained, in which a youthful mind can lose itself in delights” 
(“Die Fabeln des erstern zogen mich unendlich an, weil in ihnen eine Welt 
enthalten ist, worein ein jugendlicher Geist sich nur mit Entzücken verlieren 
kann” [Ibid.]). Mirabella is attracted to the morals of these fables. In her 
statement, she even provides a focus to this attraction—it is her “youthful mind” 
that delights in La Fontaine’s world. The kind of morality and thus chastity that 
she desires is firstly intellectual; it is not governed by sentiment, but rather it is 
something to be learned, and as Mirabella further argues, “[I]f anyone should 
believe that I, as a woman, have only found interest in [sentiment], I will confess 
to them without a doubt that Corneille’s [intellect] is as agreeable to me as 
Racine’s sentiment” (“Ob man gleich glauben sollte, daβ ich, als Frauenzimmer, 
meine Rechnung nur bei dem letzteren gefunden haben könne, so gestehe ich 
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doch ohne Bedenken, daβ die Stärke Corneille’s mir wenigstens eben so zusagte, 
als die Sentimentalität Racine’s” [Ibid.]). Mirabella provides a new gendered 
discourse on the type of morality available to her sex. Her chastity will have as 
much intellect as it does emotion. Finally, it is equal to any morality stipulated as 
specifically masculine. She concludes by stating, “I gave as much preference to a 
strong mind as keenly as men have” (“Ich gab dem ersteren um des kräeftigen 
Gemüthes willen […] im Ganzen Vorzug, wie eifrig auch die Männer” [Ibid.]). 
Mirabella is pursuing a form of morality equal to that of any man, and not only 
that, but she is also confident that she has just as much of a chance to achieve it. 
 
However, by the second half of the first letter, Mirabella acquires a new reading 
list on account of her acquaintance with a man named Moritz. Moritz himself has 
just returned to Germany from a three-year stay in Italy and to some extent he 
represents a Goethean figure who has embarked on a bourgeois voyage of 
development. But while Moritz’s budding teacher-student relationship with 
Mirabella may be a metaphor of Goethe’s own influence on Unger, Mirabella is 
able to cultivate her self far beyond Moritz, who remains a static figure in the 
novel. Nevertheless, Mirabella’s discussions with him on the significance of 
Italian literature are necessary to furthering her moral self-cultivation, even if just 
temporarily so. In Moritz’s first conversation with Mirabella, he tells her, “I am 
inclined to only search for true Poesie among the Italians” (“Dennoch bin ich sehr 
geneigt, die wahre Poesie nur bei den Italiänern zu suchen” [18]). The primacy of 
his argument is to provide a specific literary discourse. For eight weeks, he 
lectures to her on three Italian Renaissance writers: Ludovico Ariosto, Torquato 
Tasso and Battista Guarini. In one of his lessons, he asks, “What creation is 
contained within that liberated Jerusalem? Which Frenchman can claim to have 
something similar emanate from him?” (“Welche Schöpfung ist in dem befreieten 
Jerusalem enthalten; und wo ist der Franzose, welcher behaupten dürfte, eine 
ähnliche sey von ihm ausgegangen?“ [Ibid.]). Poesie, that crucial term within 
Romantic thought, Moritz argues (in very much the same vein as Goethe), is 
perfectly reflected in the poetry of the Italians alone. His example for this is not 
arbitrary. In citing “that liberated Jerusalem,”, he references Torquato Tasso’s 
epic poem Jerusalem Delivered (La Gerusalemme liberata; 1575) and in doing so 
also calls to mind Goethe’s play Torquato Tasso (1790), which he composed 
immediately after his return to Weimar from his Italian journey. Tasso’s epic 
poem, historically and fictionally, elevates the language of sentiment to something 
that is refined, natural and graceful. That is, it is a poem of heightened emotions. 
Moritz states further, “I don’t want truth, but rather beauty, a conformity with 
one’s self and harmony in the highest meaning of the word” (“Nicht Wahrheit 
will ich, sondern Schönheit, Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst, Harmonie in der 
höchsten Bedeutung des Worts” [Ibid.]). The ennobled expression of feeling is 
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one that conforms to a certain classical model and which also correlates to a 
control of the passions. It is this latter point that has a profound impact on 
Mirabella through the course of her studies and which causes her to expand her 
definition of morality to include this component. This second concept is 
significant in highlighting Mirabella’s modern pursuit, for its purpose is not, as it 
is within the Bible, to remove a certain sin, but more so in enlightened terms to 
eradicate an irrational power within her which refuses to obey reason (Foucault 
55). 
 
The second letter of the Confessions marks a significant step in Mirabella’s moral 
self-cultivation. While her readings in the first letter are mediated through others, 
specifically men—first her adoptive father and then later Moritz—in the second 
letter she begins to choose her own authors and texts and, as such, she begins to 
independently exercise her spiritual practice. On her own initiative, Mirabella 
studies literature and language with a fifteen-year-old princess named Caroline at 
a summer palace for three months. Though the content of these various texts is a 
repetition, and an affirmation, of what Mirabella has already been learning both in 
terms of chastity and controlled passions, it is significant that the books she reads 
here are of her own choosing—from the idylls of the Swiss poet Salomon Gessner 
to the Spanish poets Boscan and Garcilaso and the Portuguese poet Jorge de 
Montemayor (51). The text that stands out to Mirabella the most is Montemayor’s 
Diana (1559), a Renaissance novel that celebrates women with the feminine 
values of purity, chastity, modesty and virginity. It is also through these texts that 
Mirabella’s self begins to transform. She tells Cäsar: “We never tired to read 
again and again until these books had completely permeated through us… only 
then would we go back to the summer palace to have lunch and during this time 
the material within us would spiritualize” (“Wir wurden nicht müde es zu lesen 
und wieder zu lesen, bis wir ganz Davon durchdrungen waren […]  so kehrten wir 
in das Lustschloβ zurück, wo wir […] zu Mittag aβen, und uns auf diese Weise 
selbst das Materielle vergeistigten” [51]). The linking of reflection, eating and 
spiritualizing is not coincidental, for through these actions Mirabella 
metaphorically digests, in a way quite similar to an anti-communion,ix the 
material she is reading and this digestion symbolizes her successful intake of the 
moral knowledge that she has hand-picked. Thus, the moment in which Mirabella 
is able to independently craft her self—both in her choice of reading material and 
in the application of its literary depictions of morality to her way of thinking—
signifies, like the conversion moment in a pietistic confession, the moment of her 
transformation. 
 
The narrative then takes an interesting turn. Unlike the Bildungsroman, the 
Confessions is not structured as an unending journey of education and 
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development. Rather, in terms of structure, it reads more like Francke’s 
Curriculum Vitae, in which, after having come to faith, he delineates the “fruit” of 
his new way of life.x Mirabella’s transformation, i.e., the moment in which she 
claims to have achieved her unique moral form, occurs almost at the exact middle 
point of her confessions, acting like a climax. The second half of her letters are 
comprised of observations and commentaries, proofs really, on the aesthetic 
arrangement of her morality, how the spiritual and the physical are linked in her 
newly cultivated self. Mirabella’s physicality, however, has been a point of debate 
within recent scholarship, and there are some who argue that Mirabella is lacking 
in any kind of physicality. For example, Elisabeth Krimmer (2005) states, “The 
first part of Mirabella’s story focuses all its narrative energy on the dissociation of 
woman and body. But Unger does not stop at creating a virginal heroine. Rather, 
all actual and metaphorical ties between the female protagonist and her bodily 
existence need to be cut” (246). This supposed lack, scholars have argued, reveals 
how the Confessions is simply following in the footsteps of Goethe’s 
“Confessions;” near the end of the “Confessions,” Goethe’s “beautiful soul” 
states, “My soul would think without the company of my body; it regarded the 
body itself as a being foreign to it, just as one regards clothing” (“Meine Seele 
ohne Gesellschaft des Körpers dächte; sie sah den Körper selbst als ein ihr 
fremdes Wesen an, wie man ein Kleid aussieht” [HA 7:415]). There are others, 
such as Cindy Brewer (2006), who have argued instead that Mirabella does in fact 
possess a certain physical form, but that it can only be understood artificially, 
namely in her mode of dress. Once again, the comparison is made between 
Mirabella and Goethe’s “beautiful soul,” the latter of which who cares very little 
for her clothes, at one time giving her entire wardrobe away (HA 7:418), and at 
another time even enjoying how terrible her clothes look on her (HA 7:399). If 
this was the case then Mirabella’s claimed morality could easily be relegated to 
the realm of the superficial and the performative. This article disagrees with both 
arguments: the lack of physicality and the artificial dress. In regard to the latter, 
Mirabella’s fashion is an odd point of departure considering that the Confessions 
makes but a few references to clothing. More significantly, when Mirabella does 
bring attention to her own dress, it is not to emulate or in any way correspond to 
the appearance of the “beautiful soul” but rather to make fun of her poorly 
constructed artifice; for the little attention given to Mirabella’s clothing in the 
Confessions has more to do with the novel’s attempt to challenge the claim that a 
person’s clothes alone reflect his or her essence. 
 
Mirabella instead institutes a new aesthetic program based on physiognomy. She 
establishes an entire dissertation on the greater connection between the face and a 
person’s character, arguing that she can ascertain the moral state of her own self 
through her physique. For example, she tells Cäsar in her third letter, “I want to 
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make an artistic comment … The Beautiful is only the result of inner harmony, of 
a constructed character” (“Ich [will] nur noch eine artistische Bemerkung 
machen… Die Schönheit als etwas Sichtbares, nur immer das Resultat einer 
inneren Harmonie ist, die in sich selbst einen Charakter bildet” [81]). In this 
claim, Mirabella sets up a paradigm in which a well-constructed moral self is 
made evident through physical manifestations of beauty, whereas its failings 
conversely result in excesses of the body, such as being made ugly or a 
degeneration in health. These physiological conceptions are quite unique for late 
eighteenth-century Germany in that they incorporate both biblical principles and 
modern conceptions of physiognomy. In the Bible, a person suffered from bodily 
ills or diseases if his or her soul was impure. This is made particularly explicit in 
the Old Testament, in which various diseases, such as consumption, fever and 
inflammation (Deut. 28:22), boils (Exod. 9:8-12) or even death (Jer. 9:20-22; 
14:12) was inflicted upon the Israelites whenever they disobeyed God. 
Conversely, obedience was rewarded with longevity of life (Exod. 20:12). It is to 
these religious notions of good health that Mirabella incorporates the study of an 
aesthetically-based physical perfection from ancient Greece, a study espoused by 
Johann Kaspar Lavater’s essays on physiognomy (1775-1778) and Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann’s “Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting 
and Sculpture” (“Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der 
Malerei und Bildhauerkunst” [1756]). Mirabella reveals her knowledge of these 
scholars by contending that the physiognomy of the Greeks, more so than either 
that of the French or the Italians, as made evident in their statuesque figures, 
provides the best template to assess the moral cultivation of the self, for at the 
heart of Greek art is “an inner harmony between mind and soul” (“eine innere 
Harmonie zwischen Gemüth und Geist” [81]). This purity of the physical body 
alone can confirm a moral integrity of the self.xi By linking an ideal mode of 
being and physique, Mirabella argues that a woman should not just exist as a 
“beautiful soul,” but rather she should also have an accompanying beautiful body, 
prompting her to claim near the end of her confessions, “A beautiful soul can only 
live within a beautiful body” (“Eine schöne Seele könne nur in einem schönen 
Körper wohnen” [Ibid.]).xii 
 
For this reason, in her pursuit of moral self-cultivation, Mirabella does not have to 
make a choice between the development of her mind or her physical body; rather, 
she sees the cultivation of her self and the care of her body as interconnected. 
Mirabella only has to regularly assess her facial features and chestnut brown hair 
in the mirror every morning. This activity, she argues, is not purposeless. She tells 
Cäsar: “I can assure you with all truth that my frequent visits to the mirror are not 
spent in vain; this inspection grants me a true image of my self” (“Mit Wahrheit 
aber kann ich versichern, daβ mich das öftere Hintreten vor dem Spiegel nicht 
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eitel machte; diese Beschauung gewährte mir nur ein Bild von mir selber” [6]). 
Mirabella uses these inspections to assess the entire trajectory of her moral self, 
not only its current state but also from whence it has come. The inclusion of her 
hair in this activity is significant, for, as Lavater argues in his Physiognomic 
Fragments (Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenenntnis 
und Menschenliebe), a person’s hair directly impacts, either positively or 
negatively, his or her facial features: “A tiny curve or point, a lengthening or 
shortening, often only by the width of a thread of hair; the most minute 
displacement or distortion—how noticeably something like this can change a 
face, the expression of a character trait!”xiii (“Eine kleine Biegung oder Schärfe, 
eine Verlängerung oder Verkürzung, oft auch nur um die Breite eines Fadens, 
eines Haares; die mindeste Verrückung oder Schiefheit, wie merklich kann 
dadurch ein Gesicht, der Ausbruck eines Charakters verändert werden” [143]). 
Thus the “luxurious growth of her hair” (“die Üppigkeit meines Haarwuchses” 
[6]) plays a significant role in making her facial features more beautiful. But even 
where she is not beautiful, Mirabella believes that she is, at the very least, 
becoming “pretty” (“hübsch” [Ibid.]). Furthermore, throughout her entire life 
from childhood onward, Mirabella never gets sick. Here then is one of the greatest 
distinguishing features between Mirabella and Goethe’s beautiful soul, namely 
that while the latter slowly digresses physically throughout her confession, 
thereby revealing the failings of her self as reflected in the degradation of the 
body, Mirabella, in contrast, continues to remain a picture of good health (95). In 
this way, Mirabella’s moral self is confirmed. 
 
Finally, having cultivated a specific moral form with an accompanying aesthetic 
arrangement, Mirabella needs to undergo a testing procedure in order to, using the 
words of Foucault, move forward in the true acquisition of her cultivated self 
(58). In typical eighteenth-century fashion, the court is constructed for Mirabella 
as the site in which to be tested. It is Mirabella’s task to live amidst its vices, 
namely amorality and superficiality, to consider if they have a representation 
within her own moral self and, if so, to “shake them out” (Ibid., 61). In this way, 
Mirabella will, as her adoptive father tells her, treat her self like “a diamond being 
polished” (“was der Diamant durch die Politur erhält” [34]). Interestingly, this 
notion of being tested also finds its origins in the traditional confession, which 
describes how a believer must undergo various trials in the outside world in order 
to make his or her faith genuine. It is only after the religious convert has been 
“refined through fire” that he or she will be able to rid one’s self of sin and thus 
be made “perfect and complete.”xiv Likewise, Mirabella must struggle within the 
court, a place that she recognizes exists wholly in contradiction to her newly 
cultivated moral self (33), in order that she may strip off anything that hinders her 
from being both chaste as well as in control of her own passions. However, her 
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intent deviates from the earlier tradition in that she will both assess and remove 
faults according to her own rules of conduct as opposed to those more 
institutionally prescribed. According to this modern self-examination, if faults are 
identified, Mirabella would not charge her self as being guilty per se, but rather 
her course of action would be “to determine the rational equipment needed for 
future, wiser behavior” (Foucault 62). 
 
During Mirabella’s time at court, she makes a radical discovery: moral self-
cultivation is only possible through a consistent and attentive focus on the self, 
whereas amorality is the result of a lacking care thereof. She continues to provide 
an acute diagnosis of the persons of the court, arguing that the root cause of their 
vices is not a pre-existing sinful state, but rather slothfulness, which leads to 
boredom, and it is this latter condition that causes various dysfunctions of the self. 
Mirabella supports this new idea in her analysis of the court’s obsession with card 
playing, of which she states, “[Card playing], which is so often conducted at 
court, is a pis aller;xv because it is impossible for this society to keep itself 
engaged in noble ways, they have found a loophole to not stay completely idle” 
(“Das Spiel, so wie es am Hofe getrieben wird, ist ein pis aller; weil es unmöglich 
ist, eine groβe Gesellschaft auf eine edle Weise in Thätigkeit zu setzen, so hat 
man diesen Ausweg erfunden, sie nicht ganz unbeschäftigt zu lassen” [36]). From 
her observation of the court’s vices and its causes, Mirabella begins to fortify 
herself accordingly by assembling a rigid, daily routine. Like her time at the 
summer residence, she wakes up early every morning, no matter the season; she 
then washes, gets dressed and conducts various chores (35); the rest of her day is 
spent reading.xvi The continuation of her spiritual practice during this time is 
significant for three reasons. First, it enables her to continue meditating on and 
applying her chosen truths to her self. Second, her rigid routine, of which her 
reading is a part, prevents her from becoming bored. Third, the timing of her 
spiritual practice is crucial in that, since it is conducted in the afternoon or 
evening, she is able to “review the day that had gone by, specifically [her] 
progress that day” (Foucault 60-61), thereby considering if there had been 
moments in which she had failed in the care of her self or conversely which vices 
she had resisted and, in conjunction to this, in what respect she had been made 
better. It is through this process, through her own efforts, her own constant 
diligence, that refinement becomes possible. 
 
To this, on account of her time at court, Mirabella comes to represent a champion 
of middle class morals; for it is in her successful refinement that the moral self 
she seeks to embody is proven worthy, allowing her to differentiate herself, first, 
from Goethe’s “beautiful soul” and, second, from the prototypical courtly woman 
in the Confessions, who is not given a first name either but rather is only referred 
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to as “Madame Etiquette.” The form of Mirabella’s self is genuine, whereas both 
“the beautiful soul” and “Madame Etiquette” exist superficially. The latter two 
lack, in Mirabella’s words, “an inner content” and a “true core” (“innerer Gehalt,” 
“eigentlicher Kern” [34]), the proof of which is found in their inability to create 
more for their self than just an impression of morality. Mirabella critiques 
Goethe’s “beautiful soul” in that, in her retreat from the court, she never allowed 
her self to be tested and thus, in contrast to Mirabella, she can never fully measure 
whether her moral self possesses faults or not. “Madame Etiquette,” on the other 
hand, uses wit and guise, in particular through her recitation of rhymes and verses, 
in order to elevate her superficial language to an art form. But while she talks in 
guise, Mirabella conversely speaks only of those truths that comprise her self, 
thereby reflecting a truer and higher “culture” (“die höhere Cultur” [45]). In other 
words, while “Madame Etiquette” tries to depict herself as being more virtuous 
than she actually is, Mirabella’s speech perfectly reflects her own morality. Thus, 
in having Mirabella analyze her motives, assert her virtues, and reject supposedly 
female faults such as vanity, she comes to embody the tested, virtuous woman. 
This achievement allows her to become positioned among other fictional women 
such as Frau Sternheim in Sophie von La Roche’s The Story of Young Lady von 
Sternheim (Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim [1771]) and the Countess in 
Christian Fürchtegott Gellert’s Life of the Swedish Countess of G*** (Leben der 
schwedischen Gräfin von G*** [1746]). Mirabella’s bourgeois affinities in fact 
extend across national borders. Many German scholars argue that the feminine 
virtues upheld in the Confessions and other German novels around 1800 were 
taken directly from, or at the very least influenced, by their English and French 
counterparts. Barbara Becker-Cantarino (2005) argues that Sophie von La 
Roche’s Sternheim is fashioned in the model of Richardson’s Pamela, or Virtue 
Rewarded (1740) and Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady (1747-1748) as 
well as Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse (1761) (12). Judith E. Martin also 
argues that La Roche integrated elements from both Richardson’s and Rousseau’s 
works and, furthermore, that subsequent German women novelists, including 
Unger, drew not only on Sternheim in the German tradition, but also on the earlier 
international models of Richardson and Rousseau (“Introduction” 8). Finally, not 
being a member of the aristocracy, Mirabella is able to illustrate, in the same vein 
as Lady Sternheim and Clarissa, that nobility is determined by devotion to 
morality rather than social standing. 
 
Mirabella’s moral cultivation of both her mind and her body into a true form by 
the end of the Confessions points to her ability, as Foucault argues, to rule over 
her self (68). Foucault states that the goal of modern self-cultivation is a 
conversion of the self—of epistrope eis heauton—meaning that one has become 
his or her own master, free of all dependencies and enslavements (Ibid., 65). 
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Through this long letter to Cäsar, Mirabella has shown how she crafted her moral 
self, separate from pre-existing systems of thought as well as without the help of a 
metaphysical counterpart, the result of which is that she is able to claim that she is 
an independent individual, deserving of respect. Indeed, Mirabella makes frequent 
references and ascribes great importance both to her independent individuality as 
well as her “peculiarity” (“Eigenthümlichkeit” [1]), recognizing how both were 
not considered proper for a woman. In this way, Mirabella makes herself a new 
and even more secular example to not only the ideal representation of the pietistic 
beautiful soul—typically defined as a passive, virtuous woman, leading an 
introverted life according to biblical precepts—but also to Goethe’s “beautiful 
soul,” who though also largely secular in self nonetheless still develops under the 
direction of men. Mirabella’s new image of the beautiful soul serves as the 
foundation for a more modern understanding of a woman who is in control of her 
own cultivation, including what she reads, how she applies it to her self and how 
she subsequently thinks and acts. Finally, her self-mastery allows for her to claim 
moral authenticity. Her moral self provides an alternative to the superficiality of 
moral performance while still allowing for subjectivity, an achievement that 
conveys a sense of self-importance as well as self-satisfaction. 
 
                                                          
i
 See Niggl for one of the most detailed accounts on the history of German autobiographical 
writing during the eighteenth century. For further references, see both Misch and Steussy. 
ii
 Henceforth cited as Confessions. 
iii
 “HA” refers to the Hamburg edition of Goethe’s collected works. 
iv
 For more on the intertextuality between Unger’s Confessions and Goethe’s “Confessions,” see 
Giesler (11, 55, 73-74) and Zantop (29-32). For further comparison, see Henn and Hufeisen. 
v
 See Brewer, Lange, Richards, Schmid and Zantop. These feminist critics, however, widely differ 
in regard to what exactly Unger revises in her Confessions. For example, Anna Richards (2005) 
considers the emancipatory potential of the heroine’s inner self in order to achieve her own unique 
individuality (238-239). Cindy Brewer (2005) conversely argues that Unger explores the 
conditions necessary for the successful individuation of the female artist (“The Seduction of the 
Beautiful Soul” 47); and Sigrid Lange (1995) examines the difference in the act of writing 
between Mirabella and Goethe’s “beautiful soul”. 
vi
 Goethe immediately voiced his disapproval of this new feminine image because he was 
convinced that Mirabella’s development followed a male trajectory. Following the publication of 
Unger’s novel, he wrote in a newspaper article, “We simply see here a manly woman, a woman 
who thinks like a man” (“sich uns hier wirklich eine Männin, ein Mädchen wie es ein Mann 
gedacht hat [zeigt];” qtd in: Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele, 
von ihr selbst geschrieben.” Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 16 July 1806. Nr. 167. P. 
105-109). Goethe’s concern reflects the way in which Unger’s heroine challenged traditional-
eighteenth-century gender stereotypes. 
vii
 English translations by Michelle Reyes. 
viii
 The figure of the female who reads in excess is explored in several of Unger’s novels. For 
example, in her first novel Julchen Grünthal (1784), the moral development of the main 
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protagonist, Julchen, suffers and in fact rapidly digresses when she becomes exposed to a variety 
of secular texts, which she reads without discernment or reflection. 
ix
 I am grateful to those who attended my panel at the 2013 Aphra Behn Society’s biennial 
conference, “Women, Reputation, and Identity in the Long Eighteenth Century,” in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. It was during the following panel discussion that the issue of anti-communion was 
brought to my attention. 
x
 The metaphorical correlation between a Christian’s actions and the fruit that a tree produces is 
taken from the biblical passage Matthew 7:15-20. 
xi
 For a further discussion on the purity of the body and moral integrity, see Schmid (98). 
xii
 This is a modification of the famous Latin quotation “mens sana in corpore sano,” meaning “a 
sound mind in a healthy body.” 
xiii
 Translations by Michelle Reyes. 
xiv
 These two concepts are taken from the biblical passages James 1:4 and Colossians 4:12. 
xv
 “Pis aller” is a French phrase used to describe the final resort or, literally, “to go at its worst.” 
xvi
 During her time at court, Mirabella continues to be strict in choosing her reading material. She 
only wants to read books that pertain to her moral self-cultivation; any book considered “amoral” 
is rejected. For this reason, she refuses to read the works of Shakespeare because, she argues, 
matters of femininity, including chastity, are curiously missing. She argues, “Shakespeare only 
wrote for men; reading either his tragedies or his comedies for women will do as much good as 
riding a horse” (“Shakspear hat nur für Männer geschrieben, und Weiber, welche seine 
Trauerspiele und Lustspiele mit Vergnügen lesen, verderben nichts mehr an sich selbst, wenn sie 
Pferde reiten” [10]). While an argument could be made for the immorality present in 
Shakespeare’s works, it is most likely that this rejection of Shakespeare has more to do with 
Unger’s rejection of Goethe, who avidly read and advocated for his works, than an aversion to the 
works of this English playwright. 
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